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- European regulators
recorded 3,383 major ICT incidents across the financial sector during 2025
- Around one-third of
incidents had a cross-border impact, highlighting growing
interconnectedness
- System failures
accounted for more than half of all reported incidents
- Cybersecurity
incidents represented 10% of total events but remain a significant
supervisory concern
- Regulators warned
that highly capable AI-driven tools could intensify cyber threats
- Nearly one-third of
incidents originated from failures involving third-party providers
- Major disruptions
included the TARGET Services outage and the Iberian Peninsula blackout
- Supervisors are
calling for stronger cyber resilience, governance, and third-party risk
management
Europe's financial watchdogs have
warned that artificial intelligence could amplify cyber threats facing banks,
insurers, and investment firms as new data reveals the scale of
technology-related disruptions across the financial sector.
The European Banking Authority, the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and the European
Securities and Markets Authority this week published their first annual review
of major ICT-related incidents under the Digital Operational Resilience Act
(DORA), painting a picture of an increasingly interconnected and borderless
risk landscape.
According to the report, financial
institutions across the European Union reported 3,383 major ICT-related
incidents during 2025, equivalent to an average of 0.18 major incidents per
financial entity covered by DORA.
The overwhelming majority occurred
within the banking and payments sectors, reflecting their highly digital and
customer-facing nature.
While the number appears substantial, regulators stressed that incident volumes
alone should not be viewed as evidence of systemic weakness.
Instead, they argued that resilience
should be judged by the sector's ability to identify, contain, and recover from
disruptions before they escalate into wider crises.
The report found that two-thirds of
major incidents resulted in little or no disruption to customers or
transactions, suggesting that detection and response mechanisms were generally
effective.
Nevertheless, the report identifies a
growing systemic challenge. Around one-third of all major incidents had a
cross-border impact, affecting institutions and customers beyond the country
where the incident originated.
In roughly 8% of cases, more than 10
countries were affected, underlining how shared infrastructure, common service
providers, and interconnected business models can allow disruptions to spread
rapidly across jurisdictions.
System failures emerged as the most
common source of disruption, accounting for more than half of all reported
incidents.
External events represented 27%,
while payment-related incidents made up 18%. Cybersecurity incidents
represented only 10% of reported events, a figure regulators said may indicate
that existing safeguards and detection measures are proving effective.
However, the supervisory authorities
cautioned against complacency. In the accompanying press release, they noted
that "the recent evolution of highly capable AI-driven tools should
encourage financial entities to strengthen cybersecurity measures to maintain
their resilience going forward."
The report's analysis of cyber
incidents revealed that distributed denial-of-service attacks accounted for 33%
of reported cyber events, while data exfiltration, manipulation, and identity
theft represented 31%.
Credit institutions experienced a
disproportionate share of these attacks, reflecting both their scale and the
sensitive information they hold.
Perhaps the most significant finding
for risk managers concerns third-party dependency. Nearly one-third of all
major incidents originated from failures involving third-party providers,
including ICT service providers, infrastructure operators, and other financial
entities.
Regulators said this highlights the
need for stronger oversight of outsourced services and more robust third-party
risk management frameworks.
The report identified several events
that exposed the sector's interconnected vulnerabilities. A major outage
affecting TARGET Services in February 2025 disrupted securities settlement,
payments processing, and liquidity transfers across multiple markets for
several hours.
Two months later, a widespread
blackout across Spain and Portugal impaired banking operations, branches,
communications networks, and payment services throughout the Iberian Peninsula.
The supervisory authorities concluded that ICT risks are becoming increasingly
systemic, driven by shared infrastructure, outsourced services, and
cross-border operating models.
They warned that system failures and
external events remain the dominant drivers of major incidents and emphasized
the need for stronger governance, testing, resilience planning, and oversight
of critical technology providers.