• A7 allegedly moved more than $6.9 billion through the global banking system
• International banks including Standard Chartered, Citi, Deutsche Bank and DBS were touched by the network
• Shell companies, forged invoices and manipulated customs codes allegedly disguised transactions
• Some payments were reportedly linked to military goods and Russian intelligence agencies
• Banks identified and closed accounts as suspicious activity emerged 

International banks processed billions of dollars in transactions linked to a Russian-backed fintech accused of using shell companies and forged documents to circumvent Western sanctions, highlighting the challenge sophisticated networks pose to financial crime controls.

An investigation by the Financial Times, summarized by Oninvest, found that A7 funneled more than $6.9 billion through the global financial system. Some payments were reportedly connected to sensitive military goods, including purchases involving Russian intelligence agencies.

The investigation was based on hundreds of thousands of internal A7 documents and identified payments involving institutions including Standard Chartered, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, DBS and First Abu Dhabi Bank. JPMorgan Chase was also identified as having held accounts opened by A7-linked entities.

A7 was established in Russia and Kyrgyzstan with the support of Promsvyazbank, a state-owned Russian lender closely associated with the country's defense industry. The company was designed to facilitate cross-border payments after Russian banks lost access to parts of the international financial system.

According to the investigation, A7 nevertheless relied heavily on conventional banking infrastructure.

It allegedly created a network of shell companies and existing businesses capable of accessing banks connected to SWIFT, allowing payments to be made on behalf of Russian companies.

The operation reportedly went to considerable lengths to defeat anti-money laundering and sanctions controls.

A7-linked companies allegedly created false invoices and other documentation in advance to provide transactions with apparently legitimate paper trails.

The network reportedly maintained thousands of corporate seals - some counterfeit and others copied from genuine company documents.

Employees were also allegedly instructed to disguise sanctioned products by changing customs codes and transaction descriptions to resemble unrestricted goods.

The scale of the transactions illustrates the difficulty banks face when screening payments that appear legitimate at the point they enter the international banking system.

Between late 2024 and August 2025, entities linked to A7 reportedly sent $1.1 billion into accounts at Standard Chartered in Hong Kong, while $273 million went to DBS's Hong Kong branch.

Citigroup clients received $74 million and around $18 million was transferred to Deutsche Bank clients in Europe.

A7-linked entities also opened accounts at First Abu Dhabi Bank, from which more than $1.8 billion in outgoing and internal transactions were identified.

The network reportedly adapted when controls began to identify suspicious activity. After transactions involving Kyrgyz banks raised concerns at Standard Chartered in early 2025 and recipient accounts were closed, A7 shifted more activity through the United Arab Emirates.

First Abu Dhabi Bank told the FT that all identified accounts linked to A7 had been detected and closed, while DBS said it had taken appropriate action concerning an identified entity.

Standard Chartered, Citigroup, JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank emphasized their commitment to anti-money laundering requirements and associated reporting obligations but declined to comment further.

The findings expose a significant challenge for banks - sanctions screening and transaction monitoring can be undermined when sophisticated networks manipulate the documentation and counterparties on which financial institutions rely to determine whether payments are legitimate.