Hidden Supply Chain Risks Are Becoming Financial Services’ Biggest Cyber Challenge
- Supply chain cyber threats are increasingly
originating from fourth- and fifth-party dependencies that remain difficult for
firms to identify and monitor.
- Greater visibility across supplier ecosystems is becoming essential as concentration risk emerges as a key concern for financial institutions and regulators.
- Organizations are looking beyond traditional questionnaires and external scanning tools to improve cyber risk oversight and supplier assurance.
- Building resilience requires stronger collaboration, continuous monitoring, and a better understanding of critical supply chain dependencies.
What does the current
supply chain cyber security threat landscape look like?
The situation has become more
urgent, if I'm honest. Our research for this year's report on The State of
Supply Chain Security in Financial Services found that 82% of firms had
experienced a supply chain incident in the past 12 months, and 91% now rank supply
chain incidents among their top three cyber security concerns.
What's changed from previous years is where the risks are actually sitting. It is no longer just with direct suppliers anymore. A growing share of the incidents we're seeing trace back to fourth and fifth parties, the subcontractors and providers your suppliers rely on, and most firms still don't have eyes on these layers.
How can we ensure
maturity of vendor cyber security practices and improve supplier engagement and
responsiveness?
Start by dropping the
audit-and-punish mindset. When suppliers feel the relationship is adversarial,
they have every incentive to present a tidier picture than reflects reality,
and that leaves you with worse data, not better.
The firms getting genuine improvement out of their supplier base treat assurance as a collaborative endeavour rather than a compliance exercise: share findings, help suppliers fix what's broken, and give them a reason to be transparent rather than defensive. That shift alone tends to do more for supplier security maturity than a stricter questionnaire ever will.
In your experience, how
much visibility do most financial services firms actually have into their
supply chain dependencies beyond their direct suppliers, and how can we gain
better visibility?
Not nearly enough, and I think most
CISOs already know that. In our latest research, only 28% of financial services
firms told us they had excellent visibility into their Nth-party dependencies.
63% said their visibility stopped at their most critical fourth parties, and 9%
couldn't see past their own direct contracts.
But this is not surprising given the inherently bilateral nature of TPRM. Getting better visibility is both a technology and a collaboration problem. You can chase suppliers for updated dependency lists indefinitely, or you can join a network where that mapping happens as peers and suppliers add their own connections and the wider network map builds out naturally over time. The second route gets you there faster, and it keeps working as your supply chain changes.
For those less familiar
with the term, what is concentration risk, and why does it tend to hide beyond
a company's direct, first-tier suppliers?
Concentration risk is really two
different problems wearing the same name.
The first is concentration risks
facing individual organisations: your organisation relies too heavily on one
fourth or fifth party across several critical functions, so if that link fails,
the impact lands disproportionately on your critical suppliers and thus also on
you.
The second is systemic: a group of firms, sometimes a large share of an entire sector, unknowingly depend on the same underlying provider. That one stays hidden precisely because no single firm can see who else relies on that same supplier. You need visibility across multiple organisations' supply chains at once to spot it, which is exactly why it tends to surface only when firms actually compare notes with their peers.
There's a real debate
in the industry about whether scanning and scoring tools actually solve this,
or just add noise. Where do you land on that?
They have a place, but they get
more credit than they deserve. Scanning tools are genuinely good at validating
what's visible from outside: exposed ports, DNS misconfigurations, expired
certificates. These are useful signals.
Where they fall short is everything
happening behind the firewall. Our research found that 38% of practitioners see
the inability to continuously monitor a supplier's internal controls, things
like access management, network segmentation, employee training, as one of the
biggest shortcomings of their current approach. A scan can't tell you whether a
supplier has actually restricted admin access or trained staff on phishing.
That's the gap a network model is built to close. Instead of a single external scan, you get continuous input from the supplier itself, cross-checked by every other client running due diligence on them at the same time.
We're seeing
regulators, the PRA, the FCA, pay much closer attention to this. What's driving
that shift, and what should firms be doing differently as a result?
Two things are driving it. First,
regulators have accepted that prevention alone isn't realistic, so the focus
has shifted to resilience: can you keep critical services running, or recover
quickly, when a supplier does fail. Second, and this is the bigger shift,
they've stopped treating firm-level resilience as sufficient on its own. The
FCA's FG16/5 already asks firms to monitor concentration risk and plan for a
provider failing. DORA's Article 28(4)(c) and Article 29 go further, asking
firms to check whether their own contracts are reinforcing concentration risk
in the first place.
Practically, that means firms now need to map dependencies beyond their direct suppliers.
If someone in our
audience wanted to take one concrete step this week toward understanding their
own concentration risk, what would you suggest first?
Pick your five most critical suppliers and ask them, directly, who their own critical dependencies are. Not a broad supplier survey, just those five. You'll be surprised how quickly patterns emerge, sometimes the same fourth party turns up behind two or three of your own suppliers.
If you want to go further without
waiting months for responses, that's exactly the gap collaborative platforms
like Risk Ledger are built to close: you see those dependencies because your
suppliers, and often your peers' suppliers, are already mapped on the network.
We cover this in more depth, along with the data behind it, in our latest
report on the sector, “Every
Link Matters: The State of Supply Chain Security in Financial Services - UK
Edition”.
CEO & Co-Founder, Risk Ledger
Haydn Brooks is the CEO and Co-Founder of Risk Ledger, a network-first supply chain security platform transforming the way organisations manage third-party risk. Frustrated by the inefficiencies and blind spots of traditional third-party risk management (TPRM), Haydn founded Risk Ledger in 2018 with the vision of building a more connected, collaborative, and proactive way to secure global supply chains. Today, the platform enables thousands of organisations across government, financial services, healthcare, transport, and other critical sectors to move beyond static questionnaires and spreadsheets to continuously map, monitor, and mitigate risks across their entire ecosystems. Under Haydn’s leadership, Risk Ledger has become a trusted partner for CISOs and their teams, helping them identify hidden vulnerabilities like nth-party dependencies and concentration risks while strengthening collaboration between clients and suppliers. A recognised leader in cybersecurity innovation, Haydn was featured in Forbes 30 Under 30 Europe for Enterprise Technology and regularly speaks at major industry conferences on the future of supply chain security and systemic risk.
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