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Article September 17, 2026

Supplier Diversity Can Hide Dangerous Concentration Risk

Supplier Diversity Can Hide Dangerous Concentration Risk

Milena Maneva, Head of Business Continuity & Resilience EMEA, BGC Group

Financial institutions may appear to have diversified supplier ecosystems while remaining dangerously dependent on shared underlying infrastructure. Milena Maneva, Head of Business Continuity & Resilience EMEA at Cantor Fitzgerald & BGC Group, argues that effective third-party risk management requires firms to understand and test the dependencies behind their suppliers.



  • Business owners should retain accountability for the risks created by third-party relationships
  • Integrated assessments should focus on critical services and dependencies rather than isolated risk disciplines
  • Due diligence must identify fourth parties and hidden infrastructure dependencies
  • Critical recovery plans should be tested rather than simply accepted as assurance
  • Supplier diversification can conceal concentration in shared cloud, technology or geographic dependencies
  • Resilience is ultimately measured by the ability to continue operating when a critical supplier fails

As financial institutions become more reliant on external technology, cloud infrastructure and specialist providers, conventional supplier oversight may no longer reveal where their most significant vulnerabilities actually reside.

A firm can manage dozens of apparently separate relationships and still discover that several critical services ultimately depend on the same technology, location or fourth party.

For Milena Maneva, Head of Business Continuity & Resilience EMEA at Cantor Fitzgerald & BGC Group, this demands a shift in emphasis from managing suppliers to understanding dependency.

“The first principle for me is very simple: the business that chooses to depend on the third party ultimately owns the risk,” Maneva said.

Third-party risk teams can provide governance, oversight and challenge, but accountability must remain with the business responsible for the relationship.

Cybersecurity, technology, procurement, legal, compliance, operational risk and resilience functions may all participate, but distributing responsibilities can create another vulnerability.

“The danger is that everyone owns one part of the process but nobody owns the outcome,” she said.

Clear decision rights and escalation are therefore fundamental. Firms should know who can accept risk, who is responsible for remediation and who has authority to intervene when a provider breaches risk appetite or can no longer support a critical service.

“The real test is simple: when the supplier fails, do we know who makes the decision?” Maneva said.

That focus on outcomes also changes how different risk disciplines should work together. Rather than beginning with separate cyber, technology or operational risk assessments, Maneva advocates starting with what the institution is trying to protect.

Each discipline brings a necessary perspective, but those perspectives should ultimately establish how a dependency could affect delivery of critical services. Integration does not require creating one unwieldy assessment.

Instead, firms need a collective view encompassing the business service, third party, technology, data, people, locations, fourth parties and recovery capabilities.

“If this third party became unavailable tomorrow, what would stop, what would the impact be and how long could we tolerate it?” Maneva said.

“That moves the conversation away from individual risk scores and towards resilience.”

Due diligence must similarly extend beyond the supplier itself. Financial viability, cybersecurity, recovery capabilities, geographic exposures and technology dependencies all matter, but hidden dependencies further down the supply chain may represent greater threats.

Maneva describes this as “the dependency behind the dependency.”

A contracted supplier could rely on a cloud provider, data center, software platform or specialist fourth party that simultaneously supports other suppliers used by the same institution.

Evaluating those relationships separately can therefore conceal interconnected exposure.

For critical providers, Maneva believes firms should also progress from obtaining assurance to validating whether resilience measures actually work.

“A supplier telling me they have a recovery plan gives me assurance. Demonstrating that they can recover within the timeframe my critical service requires gives me evidence,” she said.

“A plan tells you what should happen. A test tells you what actually might.”

That testing must continue throughout the relationship. The risk profile established when a contract is signed can change substantially as technologies, subcontractors, financial conditions and geopolitical exposures evolve.

An institution’s own reliance on a provider can also increase gradually without being recognized.

Continuous monitoring should therefore be accompanied by scenario testing. Firms need to consider what happens if a critical supplier becomes unavailable for a day, several days or weeks, whether manual alternatives remain viable, how customers would be affected and how quickly services could transition elsewhere.

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