Financial institutions may appear to have diversified supplier ecosystems while remaining dangerously dependent on shared underlying infrastructure. Milena Maneva, Head of Business Continuity & Resilience EMEA at Cantor Fitzgerald & BGC Group, argues that effective third-party risk management requires firms to understand and test the dependencies behind their suppliers.
As financial institutions become more
reliant on external technology, cloud infrastructure and specialist providers,
conventional supplier oversight may no longer reveal where their most
significant vulnerabilities actually reside.
A firm can manage dozens of
apparently separate relationships and still discover that several critical
services ultimately depend on the same technology, location or fourth party.
For Milena Maneva, Head of Business
Continuity & Resilience EMEA at Cantor Fitzgerald & BGC Group, this
demands a shift in emphasis from managing suppliers to understanding
dependency.
“The first principle for me is very
simple: the business that chooses to depend on the third party ultimately owns
the risk,” Maneva said.
Third-party risk teams can provide
governance, oversight and challenge, but accountability must remain with the
business responsible for the relationship.
Cybersecurity, technology,
procurement, legal, compliance, operational risk and resilience functions may
all participate, but distributing responsibilities can create another
vulnerability.
“The danger is that everyone owns one
part of the process but nobody owns the outcome,” she said.
Clear decision rights and escalation
are therefore fundamental. Firms should know who can accept risk, who is
responsible for remediation and who has authority to intervene when a provider
breaches risk appetite or can no longer support a critical service.
“The real test is simple: when the
supplier fails, do we know who makes the decision?” Maneva said.
That focus on outcomes also changes
how different risk disciplines should work together. Rather than beginning with
separate cyber, technology or operational risk assessments, Maneva advocates
starting with what the institution is trying to protect.
Each discipline brings a necessary
perspective, but those perspectives should ultimately establish how a
dependency could affect delivery of critical services. Integration does not
require creating one unwieldy assessment.
Instead, firms need a collective view
encompassing the business service, third party, technology, data, people,
locations, fourth parties and recovery capabilities.
“If this third party became
unavailable tomorrow, what would stop, what would the impact be and how long
could we tolerate it?” Maneva said.
“That moves the conversation away
from individual risk scores and towards resilience.”
Due diligence must similarly extend
beyond the supplier itself. Financial viability, cybersecurity, recovery
capabilities, geographic exposures and technology dependencies all matter, but
hidden dependencies further down the supply chain may represent greater
threats.
Maneva describes this as “the
dependency behind the dependency.”
A contracted supplier could rely on a
cloud provider, data center, software platform or specialist fourth party that
simultaneously supports other suppliers used by the same institution.
Evaluating those relationships
separately can therefore conceal interconnected exposure.
For critical providers, Maneva
believes firms should also progress from obtaining assurance to validating
whether resilience measures actually work.
“A supplier telling me they have a
recovery plan gives me assurance. Demonstrating that they can recover within
the timeframe my critical service requires gives me evidence,” she said.
“A plan tells you what should happen.
A test tells you what actually might.”
That testing must continue throughout
the relationship. The risk profile established when a contract is signed can
change substantially as technologies, subcontractors, financial conditions and
geopolitical exposures evolve.
An institution’s own reliance on a
provider can also increase gradually without being recognized.
Continuous monitoring should
therefore be accompanied by scenario testing. Firms need to consider what
happens if a critical supplier becomes unavailable for a day, several days or
weeks, whether manual alternatives remain viable, how customers would be affected
and how quickly services could transition elsewhere.