Operational resilience requires more than passing predetermined tests. Ron Eisenberg of Citi explains why integrated governance, living service maps, severe scenario testing and board-owned impact tolerances are increasingly important as digital services, third parties and AI create more complex dependencies across financial institutions.
Financial institutions cannot claim genuine operational resilience if their testing programs are designed primarily to demonstrate compliance.
As digital services, third parties and AI deepen operational dependencies, firms need to deliberately stress their organizations beyond comfortable limits, expose failure points and determine whether they can protect customers when disruption becomes severe.
“Compliant organizations design tests they know they can pass to satisfy an audit checklist,” said Ron Eisenberg, Head of Operational Risk Management at Citi.
By contrast, genuinely resilient organizations intentionally test scenarios that push them to, or even beyond, their impact tolerances.
“Discomfort during an exercise is the primary indicator of its value to enhancing resilience,” he said.
Achieving that resilience requires operational risk and operational resilience to function as connected disciplines rather than parallel programs.
Eisenberg said a truly integrated framework begins with a shared risk taxonomy and unified governance structure, allowing first-line resilience and second-line risk functions to use the same language.
It should also replace separate reporting with a consolidated view for senior management and the board.
The difficulty is reconciling two different perspectives. Traditional operational risk concentrates heavily on the likelihood and severity of losses and the effectiveness of controls.
Operational resilience effectively assumes disruption has already happened and asks whether the organization can absorb the consequences.
“Bridging these two distinct worldviews and reconciling their underlying data models is where most organizations get stuck,” Eisenberg said.
Service mapping provides an important connection between them. Rather than becoming a standalone operational exercise, maps should connect system dependencies and risk assessment control ratings directly to critical business services.
Governance must reinforce that integration. Eisenberg advocates unified risk and resilience oversight co-chaired by risk and operations, supported by a shared data architecture.
Risk indicators, key risk indicator breaches and disruption metrics should feed into resilience dashboards rather than being maintained across duplicated systems.
Testing then needs to turn those maps into practical crisis preparation.
“Move away from isolated IT disaster recovery tests,” Eisenberg said. Instead, firms should integrate technical testing with cross-functional, end-to-end scenarios culminating in executive decision-making and war-gaming.
The objective should extend beyond establishing whether technology survives. Disruption can expose weaknesses in the handoffs between operations, legal, communications, third parties and risk.
Exercises should consequently test how those functions make decisions together under pressure.
Service maps must also remain current. “If a service map isn't actively used to design severe-but-plausible test scenarios, it quickly becomes a historical document rather than an operational tool,” Eisenberg said.
Growing dependence on digital services, AI and external providers also demands a rethink of impact tolerances.
Traditional continuity strategies have frequently centered on recovery time objectives, measuring how quickly an internal application or server can be restored.
Eisenberg argues that this is no longer sufficient.