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Article October 30, 2026

Banks Face Hidden Third Party Risks Despite Supplier Diversification

Banks Face Hidden Third Party Risks Despite Supplier Diversification

Milena Maneva, Head of Business Continuity & Resilience EMEA, BGC Group

Milena Maneva, Head of Business Continuity and Resilience EMEA at Cantor Fitzgerald, warns that financial institutions may underestimate hidden third-party concentration risks. She explains why effective resilience depends on clear business accountability, mapping underlying dependencies, validating supplier recovery capabilities and preparing for simultaneous disruptions across critical services.



  • Supplier diversification can conceal shared technology dependencies
  • Business owners must retain accountability for third-party risks
  • Integrated assessments should focus on critical service continuity
  • Fourth-party dependencies can create hidden concentration exposures
  • Recovery testing provides stronger evidence than supplier assurances
  • Continuous monitoring must reflect changing supplier risk profiles
  • Exit strategies should address operational dependencies, not just contracts
  • Scenario testing should assess simultaneous failures across critical services

Financial institutions may be dangerously overestimating their operational resilience because seemingly diversified supplier networks conceal shared technology dependencies capable of disrupting multiple critical services simultaneously.

Milena Maneva, Head of Business Continuity and Resilience EMEA at Cantor Fitzgerald, warns that effective third-party risk management requires organizations to look beyond individual suppliers and understand the underlying infrastructure, subcontractors and services upon which their operations depend.

"You can look diversified on paper and still be highly concentrated underneath," she says.

An institution might maintain relationships with ten different suppliers, for example, only to discover that eight depend on the same cloud platform, data center or telecommunications provider.

Maneva argues that this distinction between supplier concentration and dependency concentration is fundamental to understanding operational resilience.

While conventional concentration assessments measure exposure to individual vendors, dependency analysis reveals where multiple critical business services rely on the same underlying capabilities.

However, identifying these exposures requires more than improving supplier inventories. Organizations must also establish clear accountability for the risks created by outsourcing.

"The first principle for me is very simple: the business that chooses to depend on the third party ultimately owns the risk," Maneva explains.

Although procurement, cybersecurity, technology, compliance and operational risk teams all contribute to oversight, she cautions against allowing shared responsibilities to obscure accountability.

"The danger is that everyone owns one part of the process but nobody owns the outcome."

Business owners must therefore understand their dependencies, possess clearly defined decision-making authority and know when to escalate emerging threats.

Maneva emphasizes that accountability must function during actual disruptions, not merely exist within governance documentation.

She also advocates integrating different risk disciplines around the critical services an organization must protect.

Rather than combining every assessment into an unwieldy framework, institutions should establish a common understanding of the relationships connecting business services, suppliers, technology, data, personnel, locations, fourth parties and recovery arrangements.

"If this third party became unavailable tomorrow, what would stop, what would the impact be and how long could we tolerate it?" she asks.

The same operational focus should guide supplier due diligence.

Traditional assessments of financial viability, cybersecurity controls and contractual obligations remain important, but they must be supplemented by scrutiny of subcontractors and hidden technology dependencies.

For critical relationships, Maneva argues that institutions should move beyond accepting assurances about recovery arrangements toward validating whether those arrangements work.

"A supplier telling me they have a recovery plan gives me assurance. Demonstrating that they can recover within the timeframe my critical service requires gives me evidence."

Testing should reflect realistic disruption scenarios, challenging assumptions about recovery times, alternative arrangements and the continued delivery of essential services.

"A plan tells you what should happen. A test tells you what actually might," she says.

Maneva also stresses that third-party risk management must continue throughout the supplier relationship.

A vendor's financial condition, technology infrastructure, subcontractors and geographic exposure can change significantly after onboarding, while the institution's reliance on that supplier may increase without attracting sufficient attention.

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