Milena Maneva, Head of Business Continuity and Resilience EMEA at Cantor Fitzgerald, warns that financial institutions may underestimate hidden third-party concentration risks. She explains why effective resilience depends on clear business accountability, mapping underlying dependencies, validating supplier recovery capabilities and preparing for simultaneous disruptions across critical services.
Financial institutions may be
dangerously overestimating their operational resilience because seemingly
diversified supplier networks conceal shared technology dependencies capable of
disrupting multiple critical services simultaneously.
Milena Maneva, Head of Business
Continuity and Resilience EMEA at Cantor Fitzgerald, warns that effective
third-party risk management requires organizations to look beyond individual
suppliers and understand the underlying infrastructure, subcontractors and
services upon which their operations depend.
"You can look diversified on
paper and still be highly concentrated underneath," she says.
An institution might maintain
relationships with ten different suppliers, for example, only to discover that
eight depend on the same cloud platform, data center or telecommunications
provider.
Maneva argues that this distinction
between supplier concentration and dependency concentration is fundamental to
understanding operational resilience.
While conventional concentration
assessments measure exposure to individual vendors, dependency analysis reveals
where multiple critical business services rely on the same underlying
capabilities.
However, identifying these exposures
requires more than improving supplier inventories. Organizations must also
establish clear accountability for the risks created by outsourcing.
"The first principle for me is
very simple: the business that chooses to depend on the third party ultimately
owns the risk," Maneva explains.
Although procurement, cybersecurity,
technology, compliance and operational risk teams all contribute to oversight,
she cautions against allowing shared responsibilities to obscure
accountability.
"The danger is that everyone
owns one part of the process but nobody owns the outcome."
Business owners must therefore
understand their dependencies, possess clearly defined decision-making
authority and know when to escalate emerging threats.
Maneva emphasizes that accountability
must function during actual disruptions, not merely exist within governance
documentation.
She also advocates integrating
different risk disciplines around the critical services an organization must
protect.
Rather than combining every
assessment into an unwieldy framework, institutions should establish a common
understanding of the relationships connecting business services, suppliers,
technology, data, personnel, locations, fourth parties and recovery arrangements.
"If this third party became
unavailable tomorrow, what would stop, what would the impact be and how long
could we tolerate it?" she asks.
The same operational focus should
guide supplier due diligence.
Traditional assessments of financial
viability, cybersecurity controls and contractual obligations remain important,
but they must be supplemented by scrutiny of subcontractors and hidden
technology dependencies.
For critical relationships, Maneva
argues that institutions should move beyond accepting assurances about recovery
arrangements toward validating whether those arrangements work.
"A supplier telling me they have
a recovery plan gives me assurance. Demonstrating that they can recover within
the timeframe my critical service requires gives me evidence."
Testing should reflect realistic
disruption scenarios, challenging assumptions about recovery times, alternative
arrangements and the continued delivery of essential services.
"A plan tells you what should
happen. A test tells you what actually might," she says.
Maneva also stresses that third-party
risk management must continue throughout the supplier relationship.
A vendor's financial condition,
technology infrastructure, subcontractors and geographic exposure can change
significantly after onboarding, while the institution's reliance on that
supplier may increase without attracting sufficient attention.