Financial institutions face growing cybersecurity exposure from suppliers hidden deep within their supply chains. Haydn Brooks, CEO & Co-Founder, Risk Ledger, argues that greater visibility, collaboration and continuous monitoring are essential as fourth- and fifth-party dependencies create potentially dangerous concentration risks.
Financial institutions are
confronting a supply chain cybersecurity problem that increasingly extends
beyond the suppliers they can directly see and assess, leaving potentially
critical vulnerabilities buried several layers deep in complex third-party ecosystems.
Haydn Brooks, CEO & Co-Founder,
Risk Ledger, says the threat has become significantly more urgent.
Research cited by Brooks found that
82% of financial services firms had experienced a supply chain incident during
the previous 12 months, while 91% now rank such incidents among their three
biggest cybersecurity concerns.
"The situation has become more
urgent, if I'm honest," Brooks says. "A growing share of the
incidents we're seeing trace back to fourth and fifth parties, the
subcontractors and providers your suppliers rely on, and most firms still don't
have eyes on these layers."
That lack of visibility presents a
significant challenge. Only 28% of financial services firms reported excellent
visibility into their Nth-party dependencies, while 63% could see only as far
as their most critical fourth parties. Another 9% lacked visibility beyond
their direct contractual relationships.
Brooks says improving that position
requires both better technology and greater collaboration across supplier
ecosystems rather than repeatedly requesting updated dependency information
from individual providers.
The visibility gap becomes
particularly significant when institutions attempt to understand concentration
risk.
"Concentration risk is really
two different problems wearing the same name," Brooks says.
The first occurs when an individual
institution relies too heavily on the same fourth- or fifth-party provider
across several critical functions.
The second is systemic - multiple
financial institutions may unknowingly depend on the same underlying provider.
"That one stays hidden precisely
because no single firm can see who else relies on that same supplier,"
Brooks says. Identifying it therefore requires visibility across multiple
organizations' supply chains.
External scanning and scoring tools
can help, but Brooks cautions against treating them as a complete solution.
"They have a place, but they get
more credit than they deserve," he says.
Such tools can identify externally
visible problems including exposed ports, DNS misconfigurations and expired
certificates.
They cannot provide the same
visibility into internal controls such as access management, network
segmentation or employee training.
Some 38% of practitioners identified
the inability to continuously monitor suppliers' internal controls as a major
weakness in their existing approach.
"A scan can't tell you whether a
supplier has actually restricted admin access or trained staff on
phishing," Brooks says.
Financial institutions may also need
to rethink how they engage suppliers. Brooks argues that an adversarial
approach to assurance can actually reduce transparency.