Geopolitical crises are moving too quickly for rigid playbooks to predict every outcome. Senior risk and sanctions leaders argue that banks instead need clear decision makers, adaptable crisis frameworks, defined risk tolerances and immediate access to expertise as sanctions regimes fragment and information accelerates.
Financial institutions should stop expecting geopolitical playbooks to predict how the next crisis will unfold and instead use them to identify who needs to make decisions when disruption hits.
Speaking at CeFPro’s Risk Evolve 2026 event, a global head of sanctions and geopolitical risk at an international investment bank said the process of creating a playbook is often more valuable than its detailed instructions.
“If there’s a fire, do you follow the fire evacuation plan? The answer is, generally speaking, you probably do,” he said. But geopolitical events involve too many variables for institutions to prescribe precisely what should happen next.
Instead, playbooks should establish stakeholder maps and decision-making responsibilities. In a crisis, institutions need to know immediately who should be involved, who has authority and which specialists can inform decisions.
“The biggest challenge is the stakeholder map,” the sanctions executive said. The objective should be to establish responses for “day one, week one, week two, month one,” rather than attempting to predict an entire crisis.
A group chief risk officer at a European financial services group agreed that existing tools remain useful but must continuously adapt.
Previous crises had encouraged institutions to focus heavily on financial shocks, while the pandemic exposed vulnerabilities involving operations, value chains and third parties.
Formalizing crisis procedures has improved resilience, he argued, but institutions must retain sufficient flexibility to respond to unfamiliar threats.
The chief risk officer also urged firms to separate the dominant geopolitical narrative from its actual effect on their risk factors.
Wars, pandemics and sovereign debt crises may have different origins, but risk functions still need to establish how each shock transmits into asset prices, inflation, unemployment, GDP, capital and liquidity.
“Crises happen because of liquidity, don’t happen because of capital,” he said, arguing that capital consequences generally emerge later.
The head of sanctions at a global financial institution similarly warned against excessively detailed geopolitical playbooks.
When the threat is clearly defined, prescriptive instructions can work. For broader geopolitical disruption, however, false precision can create paralysis.
Organizations instead need clear long-term objectives, an established risk appetite, accessible subject matter experts and identifiable decision makers. “If you have those things in place, then you should be able to do things,” he said.
Speed is making that structure increasingly important. Information about geopolitical developments and sanctions changes can reach businesses almost instantly, creating pressure for immediate answers before their wider implications have been assessed.
The investment bank sanctions executive highlighted sanctions removal as particularly difficult.
Imposing restrictions may generate relatively straightforward instructions to stop, pause or wind down activity. Removing sanctions does not automatically mean business should restart.
“Reentry always requires rebuild first,” he said.
That distinction turns a technical compliance question into a broader risk decision. A sanctions specialist may determine whether an activity is legally permitted, but whether the institution should undertake it requires consideration of risk appetite, commercial objectives and geopolitical consequences.
The chief risk officer said this balance is becoming one of the most difficult responsibilities for senior risk leaders.