Banking liquidity specialists warn that digital payments, AI-enabled deposit switching and emerging financial technologies are undermining traditional funding stability assumptions. They advocate shorter-term stress testing, stronger intraday monitoring, operationally accessible liquidity buffers and faster crisis decision-making as regulators respond to the lessons of recent banking failures.
Banks must overhaul their liquidity
stress testing, accelerate access to emergency funding and rethink traditional
assumptions about deposit stability as digital banking transforms the speed at
which financial crises can unfold, senior financial services risk specialists
have warned.
During a panel discussion at CeFPro's
Balance Sheet Management Europe conference, a liquidity risk specialist at a UK
building society argued that institutions needed to understand the composition
of their deposit books more precisely.
This, he said, was especially
important in the context of concentrations of uninsured deposits and customers
capable of moving funds rapidly through digital channels.
He emphasized the importance of
identifying potentially vulnerable depositor groups and incorporating their
behavior into internal stress scenarios, rather than relying exclusively on
conventional liquidity coverage metrics.
The discussion highlighted the
implications of the 2023 banking turmoil, when rapid deposit withdrawals
exposed weaknesses in assumptions about funding stability and the time
available for institutions to respond.
The specialist characterized the
direction of proposed UK regulatory reforms under consultation paper CP5/26
through three priorities: "prepare, access, and prove."
These involved pre-positioning
collateral with the central bank, incorporating central bank facilities into
liquidity management frameworks and demonstrating that liquid assets could
actually be monetized during stress.
The proposals also included
shorter-term liquidity stress testing over seven days, reflecting concerns that
deposit withdrawals could materialize substantially faster than the traditional
30-day liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) horizon.
A liquidity risk specialist at an
international investment bank said European supervisors were similarly expected
to increase scrutiny of deposit assumptions and require institutions to
demonstrate how their liquidity strategies would perform under pressure.
He argued that banks needed to
establish precisely how much cash they could generate, in which currencies and
within what timeframe.
Understanding collateral
availability, counterparty requirements, settlement arrangements and potential
haircuts was essential to translating theoretical liquidity resources into
usable funding.
Governance arrangements were equally
important.
"If you need cash within the
next two hours but your whole governance takes one day, then obviously that
doesn't work," he warned.
The specialist advocated delegated
treasury authorities, clearly defined escalation procedures and practical
crisis simulations involving senior management and asset liability committees.
Such exercises frequently exposed
uncertainty about responsibilities and the appropriate response to emerging
funding pressures.
The panel also questioned whether
conventional daily liquidity reporting remained adequate as payment systems
increasingly operate in real time.
The investment bank specialist
explained that institutions could appear comfortably funded at the end of a
trading day while experiencing significant cash shortfalls earlier.
Derivatives transactions and
mismatched collateral agreements could create additional intraday funding
pressures even where underlying market exposures were hedged.
"The traditional cash flow
ladder per day, I think, doesn't work anymore," he said.
The building society specialist
advocated more sophisticated intraday monitoring and early warning indicators
capable of identifying unusual activity among specific depositor groups.
However, he cautioned that poorly
calibrated indicators could generate excessive false alarms, potentially
weakening their effectiveness when genuine problems emerged.
A banking executive at a specialist
UK bank argued that meeting customer expectations for instantaneous payments
inevitably introduced additional liquidity risks.