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Article October 21, 2026

Digital Bank Runs Expose Dangerous Gaps in Liquidity Risk Management

Digital Bank Runs Expose Dangerous Gaps in Liquidity Risk Management

Banking liquidity specialists warn that digital payments, AI-enabled deposit switching and emerging financial technologies are undermining traditional funding stability assumptions. They advocate shorter-term stress testing, stronger intraday monitoring, operationally accessible liquidity buffers and faster crisis decision-making as regulators respond to the lessons of recent banking failures.



  • Digital banking is accelerating deposit withdrawals and challenging traditional liquidity assumptions
  • UK regulatory proposals emphasize preparing, accessing and proving liquidity availability
  • Seven-day stress testing could expose vulnerabilities missed by 30-day LCR assessments
  • Banks must demonstrate that collateral can be monetized quickly during crises
  • Intraday monitoring and early warning indicators are increasingly essential
  • Slow governance processes can undermine emergency funding responses
  • AI-enabled deposit switching could intensify funding volatility
  • Stablecoins and digital currencies present emerging competitive risks

Banks must overhaul their liquidity stress testing, accelerate access to emergency funding and rethink traditional assumptions about deposit stability as digital banking transforms the speed at which financial crises can unfold, senior financial services risk specialists have warned.

During a panel discussion at CeFPro's Balance Sheet Management Europe conference, a liquidity risk specialist at a UK building society argued that institutions needed to understand the composition of their deposit books more precisely.

This, he said, was especially important in the context of concentrations of uninsured deposits and customers capable of moving funds rapidly through digital channels.

He emphasized the importance of identifying potentially vulnerable depositor groups and incorporating their behavior into internal stress scenarios, rather than relying exclusively on conventional liquidity coverage metrics.

The discussion highlighted the implications of the 2023 banking turmoil, when rapid deposit withdrawals exposed weaknesses in assumptions about funding stability and the time available for institutions to respond.

The specialist characterized the direction of proposed UK regulatory reforms under consultation paper CP5/26 through three priorities: "prepare, access, and prove."

These involved pre-positioning collateral with the central bank, incorporating central bank facilities into liquidity management frameworks and demonstrating that liquid assets could actually be monetized during stress.

The proposals also included shorter-term liquidity stress testing over seven days, reflecting concerns that deposit withdrawals could materialize substantially faster than the traditional 30-day liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) horizon.

A liquidity risk specialist at an international investment bank said European supervisors were similarly expected to increase scrutiny of deposit assumptions and require institutions to demonstrate how their liquidity strategies would perform under pressure.

He argued that banks needed to establish precisely how much cash they could generate, in which currencies and within what timeframe.

Understanding collateral availability, counterparty requirements, settlement arrangements and potential haircuts was essential to translating theoretical liquidity resources into usable funding.

Governance arrangements were equally important.

"If you need cash within the next two hours but your whole governance takes one day, then obviously that doesn't work," he warned.

The specialist advocated delegated treasury authorities, clearly defined escalation procedures and practical crisis simulations involving senior management and asset liability committees.

Such exercises frequently exposed uncertainty about responsibilities and the appropriate response to emerging funding pressures.

The panel also questioned whether conventional daily liquidity reporting remained adequate as payment systems increasingly operate in real time.

The investment bank specialist explained that institutions could appear comfortably funded at the end of a trading day while experiencing significant cash shortfalls earlier.

Derivatives transactions and mismatched collateral agreements could create additional intraday funding pressures even where underlying market exposures were hedged.

"The traditional cash flow ladder per day, I think, doesn't work anymore," he said.

The building society specialist advocated more sophisticated intraday monitoring and early warning indicators capable of identifying unusual activity among specific depositor groups.

However, he cautioned that poorly calibrated indicators could generate excessive false alarms, potentially weakening their effectiveness when genuine problems emerged.

A banking executive at a specialist UK bank argued that meeting customer expectations for instantaneous payments inevitably introduced additional liquidity risks.

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