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Article October 28, 2026

Cloud Concentration Risk Is Exposing Dangerous Gaps in Third Party Resilience

Cloud Concentration Risk Is Exposing Dangerous Gaps in Third Party Resilience

Mark Caroll, Founder of the Graduate ERM Program , Boston University

Mark Carroll, Founder – Graduate ERM Program at Boston University, warns that hidden cloud dependencies and inadequate supplier testing are exposing weaknesses in third-party resilience. He explains why financial institutions must strengthen dependency mapping, demand evidence of recovery capabilities and prepare for cloud outages rather than assuming infrastructure diversification guarantees operational continuity.



  • Hidden fourth-party dependencies create significant cloud concentration risks
  • Supplier assessments must identify underlying single-source dependencies
  • Certifications alone cannot demonstrate genuine operational resilience
  • Recovery testing and incident evidence provide stronger supplier assurance
  • Reliable operational data can help institutions function during cloud outages
  • Cloud-hosted AI must fall within existing third-party risk frameworks
  • Multi-cloud strategies may introduce complexity without eliminating concentration
  • Effective resilience requires contingency planning and dependency visibility

Financial institutions risk overestimating their operational resilience by overlooking hidden cloud dependencies and relying on supplier assurance measures that provide little evidence of how critical services would perform during a major disruption.

Mark Carroll, Founder of the Graduate ERM Program at Boston University, warns that growing dependence on cloud infrastructure and artificial intelligence requires organizations to rethink how they identify critical suppliers, assess recovery capabilities and prepare for outages.

His central argument is that established third-party risk management principles remain relevant, but organizations must extend their application beyond immediate contractual relationships to encompass the underlying technology infrastructure supporting essential services.

One of the most significant challenges is identifying fourth-party dependencies - suppliers and technology providers operating behind an institution's direct vendors.

Carroll recommends the "Use of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) as well as the identification of single and sole source vendors being used by a direct vendor."

He also advocates examining the results of supplier exercises involving data dependencies, helping organizations identify vulnerabilities that conventional vendor assessments may overlook.

However, mapping dependencies represents only part of the challenge. Carroll argues that financial institutions need stronger evidence that suppliers can actually withstand and recover from disruption.

Certifications and audit reports may establish that appropriate processes exist, but they cannot necessarily demonstrate whether those arrangements will work during a genuine operational crisis.

Instead, Carroll recommends "Access to testing results from recovery tabletops, full scale assessments and actual crisis events as well as vendor performance data."

He identifies delivery performance, completion rates, inventory management and production practices as additional indicators that can help organizations evaluate the operational resilience of critical suppliers.

The problem becomes more complicated when institutions depend heavily on a small number of major cloud providers.

Diversifying infrastructure across multiple suppliers may appear an obvious solution, but Carroll questions whether such arrangements are commercially or operationally realistic for many organizations.

Where diversification is impractical, he argues that firms should prioritize maintaining access to essential operational information when cloud services become unavailable.

"Protect yourself with good solid data management," Carroll advises.

He recommends generating regular reports covering inventory balances, production status and financial conditions, providing a fallback source of information when institutions lose access to their normal systems.

Such arrangements could enable organizations to retain visibility over critical activities even when a technology outage leaves them effectively operating blind.

The increasing integration of AI into cloud-hosted services adds another layer of complexity, particularly where organizations cannot readily identify the infrastructure supporting automated processes.

Nevertheless, Carroll rejects the suggestion that these developments necessarily require fundamentally new operational risk management frameworks.

"Operational Risk frameworks will not change but the scope of these frameworks will evolve," he says.

He argues that the complexity of cloud-hosted technologies has allowed some dependencies to escape the scrutiny traditionally applied to single-source or sole-source suppliers.

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