Banking risk specialists warn that conventional stress testing fails to capture the combined effects of geopolitical, economic and climate crises. Drawing on the ECB's 2026 reverse stress testing exercise, they call for integrated risk models, better data, realistic recovery assumptions and stronger analysis of interconnected vulnerabilities across capital, liquidity and funding.
Reverse stress testing to capture the
combined impact of geopolitical upheaval, economic disruption and
climate-related shocks needs to be fundamentally re-evaluated rather than risk-assessed
in isolation, senior banking risk specialists have warned.
Speaking during a session at CeFPro's
Balance Sheet Management Europe conference, a lead group capital stress testing
executive at a European cooperative bank argued that understanding
institutional vulnerabilities and reassessing the credibility of mitigating
actions were essential to improving financial resilience.
"We have to bring them together,
model them together because all can happen at once," he said, warning that
geopolitical crises, severe recessions and extreme weather events could strike
simultaneously.
The discussion examined lessons from
the European Central Bank's (ECB) 2026 geopolitical reverse stress testing
exercise, which required participating banks to construct scenarios capable of
producing a 300-basis-point depletion in capital over three years.
Unlike conventional stress tests,
which assess the consequences of prescribed economic conditions, the exercise
challenged institutions to identify the circumstances that could generate a
predetermined deterioration in their capital positions.
Banks were required to incorporate
three principal transmission channels: the real economy, financial markets, and
safety and security.
The cooperative bank's executive
explained that institutions could use their own modeling frameworks and
assumptions, alongside dynamic balance sheets, to construct scenarios
reflecting their particular exposures.
However, the prescribed capital depletion
created difficulties for banks with substantial capital buffers.
He acknowledged that his institution
had needed to introduce additional severe assumptions, including developments
considered less probable, to reach the required threshold.
The bank worked with an external
geopolitical research organization to develop a scenario involving
fragmentation into three competing global blocs, weakening US dollar dominance
and growing European isolation.
The exercise also incorporated a
military-led change of government in a significant market.
Selecting a sufficiently severe but
credible scenario required considerable judgment.
"That is really a balancing
act," the executive said, explaining that rapidly changing geopolitical
conditions had made previously implausible developments increasingly
conceivable.
A senior treasury and risk management
adviser at a financial technology provider questioned whether banks were
adequately capturing the speed at which geopolitical disruptions could spread
through financial markets and supply chains.
He suggested that institutions had
traditionally been more effective at modeling slow-moving crises than sudden
shocks, despite the increasing convergence of geopolitical, environmental and
economic threats.
A senior solution specialist at the
same technology provider argued that the 300-basis-point requirement was
ultimately less important than understanding how different risks propagated
through a bank's balance sheet.
He identified insufficient data
granularity as a fundamental obstacle, alongside difficulties connecting
established risk models to emerging geopolitical scenarios.
"The main issue is the
data," he said, emphasizing that additional assumptions needed to be
documented and explained to supervisors.
The specialist also questioned
whether existing recovery planning frameworks adequately reflected the behavior
of other financial institutions during systemic crises.
Banks frequently assumed they could
raise liquidity or sell portfolios during stress, without fully accounting for
competitors attempting similar actions simultaneously.
"Crises are market by
market," he said, arguing that stress testing needed to become less
institution-centric and more sensitive to marketwide dynamics.
The cooperative bank's executive
agreed that mitigating actions must be assessed differently depending on
whether a crisis affected an individual institution or the wider financial
system.