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Article October 26, 2026

Isolated Stress Tests Are Failing to Capture Global Risks, Experts Warn

Isolated Stress Tests Are Failing to Capture Global Risks, Experts Warn

Banking risk specialists warn that conventional stress testing fails to capture the combined effects of geopolitical, economic and climate crises. Drawing on the ECB's 2026 reverse stress testing exercise, they call for integrated risk models, better data, realistic recovery assumptions and stronger analysis of interconnected vulnerabilities across capital, liquidity and funding.



  • Banks urged to model geopolitical, economic and climate shocks together
  • ECB reverse stress tests required scenarios producing 300 basis points of capital depletion
  • Institutions faced difficulties balancing scenario severity with plausibility
  • Data granularity and disconnected risk models remain major weaknesses
  • Recovery plans may overestimate asset sale proceeds during systemic crises
  • Stress testing must account for competitors taking similar mitigating actions
  • Climate and geopolitical risks increasingly share transmission channels
  • Integrated capital, liquidity and funding analysis is essential

Reverse stress testing to capture the combined impact of geopolitical upheaval, economic disruption and climate-related shocks needs to be fundamentally re-evaluated rather than risk-assessed in isolation, senior banking risk specialists have warned.

Speaking during a session at CeFPro's Balance Sheet Management Europe conference, a lead group capital stress testing executive at a European cooperative bank argued that understanding institutional vulnerabilities and reassessing the credibility of mitigating actions were essential to improving financial resilience.

"We have to bring them together, model them together because all can happen at once," he said, warning that geopolitical crises, severe recessions and extreme weather events could strike simultaneously.

The discussion examined lessons from the European Central Bank's (ECB) 2026 geopolitical reverse stress testing exercise, which required participating banks to construct scenarios capable of producing a 300-basis-point depletion in capital over three years.

Unlike conventional stress tests, which assess the consequences of prescribed economic conditions, the exercise challenged institutions to identify the circumstances that could generate a predetermined deterioration in their capital positions.

Banks were required to incorporate three principal transmission channels: the real economy, financial markets, and safety and security.

The cooperative bank's executive explained that institutions could use their own modeling frameworks and assumptions, alongside dynamic balance sheets, to construct scenarios reflecting their particular exposures.

However, the prescribed capital depletion created difficulties for banks with substantial capital buffers.

He acknowledged that his institution had needed to introduce additional severe assumptions, including developments considered less probable, to reach the required threshold.

The bank worked with an external geopolitical research organization to develop a scenario involving fragmentation into three competing global blocs, weakening US dollar dominance and growing European isolation.

The exercise also incorporated a military-led change of government in a significant market.

Selecting a sufficiently severe but credible scenario required considerable judgment.

"That is really a balancing act," the executive said, explaining that rapidly changing geopolitical conditions had made previously implausible developments increasingly conceivable.

A senior treasury and risk management adviser at a financial technology provider questioned whether banks were adequately capturing the speed at which geopolitical disruptions could spread through financial markets and supply chains.

He suggested that institutions had traditionally been more effective at modeling slow-moving crises than sudden shocks, despite the increasing convergence of geopolitical, environmental and economic threats.

A senior solution specialist at the same technology provider argued that the 300-basis-point requirement was ultimately less important than understanding how different risks propagated through a bank's balance sheet.

He identified insufficient data granularity as a fundamental obstacle, alongside difficulties connecting established risk models to emerging geopolitical scenarios.

"The main issue is the data," he said, emphasizing that additional assumptions needed to be documented and explained to supervisors.

The specialist also questioned whether existing recovery planning frameworks adequately reflected the behavior of other financial institutions during systemic crises.

Banks frequently assumed they could raise liquidity or sell portfolios during stress, without fully accounting for competitors attempting similar actions simultaneously.

"Crises are market by market," he said, arguing that stress testing needed to become less institution-centric and more sensitive to marketwide dynamics.

The cooperative bank's executive agreed that mitigating actions must be assessed differently depending on whether a crisis affected an individual institution or the wider financial system.

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