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Article November 13, 2026

Banks Face a New Vendor Risk Crisis as AI Outpaces Contracts

Banks Face a New Vendor Risk Crisis as AI Outpaces Contracts

Elizabeth Blosh-Myers, VP/Director Third Party Risk Management , Thread Bank

Elizabeth Blosh-Myers, VP Third-Party and Model Risk Management at Thread Bank, warns that traditional vendor contracts are struggling to address escalating cyber threats, AI autonomy and supplier concentration. She explains why stronger accountability, continuous monitoring and more adaptable contractual protections will become essential as banks confront increasingly interconnected third-party risks through 2030.
  • Vendor contracts must establish practical cyber accountability and enforceable incident notification requirements
  • Regulators increasingly expect evidence of continuous oversight and operational resilience
  • Subcontractor dependencies create significant hidden cyber and concentration risks
  • AI contracts must address data usage, model validation, human oversight and liability
  • Dynamic contracting could link monitoring results to automated remediation triggers
  • Supplier concentration and autonomous AI will reshape third-party risk through 2030
  • Banks must strengthen exit planning and protections against regulatory and ownership changes

Banking institutions face an increasingly complex third-party risk landscape as cyber threats, artificial intelligence and regulatory scrutiny expose weaknesses in traditional vendor contracts.

Yet the greatest challenge may not be identifying emerging risks, but ensuring that contractual protections are sufficiently practical, enforceable and adaptable to address them.

Elizabeth Blosh-Myers, VP Third-Party and Model Risk Management at Thread Bank, argues that effective vendor oversight requires a fundamental shift away from static contractual arrangements toward mechanisms that establish clear accountability and support continuous risk monitoring.

Her starting point is straightforward: contractual protections offer little value if vendors refuse to accept them or institutions cannot enforce them.

"Vendors will not agree to unlimited liability. They will agree to clear rules," she says.

Cyber Accountability Requires Practical Protections

For Blosh-Myers, effective cybersecurity provisions begin with clearly defined incident notification requirements.

She advocates requiring vendors to report suspected incidents within 48 hours and confirmed incidents within 24 hours, with precise definitions establishing when those reporting obligations begin.

"Define 'know' or their investigation becomes my clock," she warns.

Rather than demanding unlimited liability, banks should negotiate higher liability caps specifically covering security breaches and regulatory fines.

Subcontractor accountability is equally important. Vendors should be required to impose equivalent security obligations on their own suppliers, while banks should retain the ability to reject proposed subcontracting arrangements.

"Most of the breaches I see come from the vendor's vendor," Blosh-Myers says.

Contracts should also establish obligations to share investigation findings, cooperate with regulators and cover notification expenses when incidents occur.

Her emphasis is on provisions that vendors will sign and banks can realistically enforce.

"A clause they won't sign protects no one. A clear trigger and a fix-it period is what I can actually use."

Regulators Want Evidence of Active Oversight

Regulatory expectations are also changing the purpose of third-party contracts.

Blosh-Myers observes that supervisors increasingly expect institutions to demonstrate ongoing vendor oversight rather than merely produce evidence that contractual agreements exist.

"Examiners used to ask if I had a contract. Now they ask if the contract lets me prove I'm watching the vendor."

This shift places greater importance on detailed audit rights, including the information banks can obtain, the frequency of access and arrangements for regulatory examination.

Operational resilience provisions must similarly move beyond general assurances.

Contracts should establish measurable recovery times, require evidence of business continuity testing and provide workable exit arrangements, including the return of bank data in usable formats.

Blosh-Myers points to the Synapse experience as a warning for banking-as-a-service providers about the consequences of inadequate exit planning.

Ongoing monitoring obligations should require vendors to supply risk metrics and complaints information while notifying banks about ownership changes, offshore relocations and replacements of critical subcontractors.

She also identifies Tennessee law and courts as a nonnegotiable contractual requirement in her approach.

Ultimately, contractual language must support demonstrable controls.

"If the contract can't produce the evidence, the examiner assumes the control isn't there," she says.

AI Is Exposing Dangerous Contractual Gaps

Artificial intelligence introduces another layer of complexity, particularly when vendors incorporate AI capabilities into products governed by agreements originally designed for conventional software.

"Vendors are selling AI and contracting like it's regular software," Blosh-Myers warns.

She identifies restrictions on vendor use of customer data for model training as an immediate priority, including prohibitions covering supposedly anonymized information.

Banks also need sufficient documentation to validate third-party AI models and contractual notification requirements when those models change.

Another concern is the introduction of AI functionality into existing products without customers' knowledge or approval.

Blosh-Myers recommends defining AI explicitly within agreements and requiring notification before new capabilities interact with bank data or customers.

Liability presents a particularly significant challenge when automated systems influence fraud detection, lending or dispute resolution.

Vendors may seek to disclaim responsibility for incorrect AI outputs, but the bank can still face regulatory consequences.

Contracts therefore need measurable quality commitments, human review rights and appropriate protections when vendor models cause compliance violations.

"The bank owns the outcome no matter who owns the model. Write the contract that way," she says.

Dynamic Contracts Could Transform Vendor Oversight

Looking ahead, Blosh-Myers expects technology to enable contracts to become active components of third-party monitoring rather than documents consulted primarily during disputes.

"Yes. The technology is here. The contract language is what's behind," she says.

She envisages systems linking continuous vendor monitoring directly to contractual obligations.

For example, deteriorating cybersecurity scores or expired assurance reports could automatically initiate remediation periods.

Vendor attestations could also be supplied as structured data, allowing reporting processes to become increasingly automated.

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